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1 The limits of ballotocracy
The ousting of President Mubarak in February
2011, after 18 days of protest, held promise at
the time of a democratic transition that would
fulfil people’s aspirations for ‘bread, freedom
and social justice/dignity’, a catchcry of the
January revolution. At a time of extreme
political volatility, there was very little
consensus between the various political forces
that instigated the revolts and the elites who
came to power thereafter about how
democratisation should be pursued. Leading
international democratisation scholars’
engagement with the post-Mubarak Egyptian
scenario was the importance of the instatement
of liberal procedural democracy through policies
such as drafting a new constitution and holding
free and fair presidential and parliamentary
elections. These measures, as will be evidenced
next, were often spoken of by Western scholars
of democracy as both milestones and as ‘reality
checks’ on how a country is progressing.
Elections in particular were treated by many
Western scholars and analysts as the channels for
citizen participation, expression of voice and as
the terrain through which battles for citizen
voices were won, even though the broader
academic literature on democratisation
recognises a more holistic understanding of
democracy in its substantive forms (such as
Fung and Wright 2003; Gaventa 2003;
O’Donnell 2010).
Egypt held its first post-Mubarak parliamentary
elections in December 2011/January 2012, and
witnessed a sweeping victory of Islamist political
parties (parties which endorse a state fully
compliant with Islamic Sharia law). The Muslim
Brotherhood, a religious-political movement
founded in 1928, won 47 per cent of the seats,
while ultra-conservative Islamist groups won
another 25 per cent of the seats. The presidential
elections which took place in June 2012 saw the
Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohamed
Morsi winning over a former air force general
Ahmed Shafiq by a very slim margin of 3 per cent
(51.7 per cent versus 48.3 per cent).
However, if one takes into account the election
turnout, it becomes clear that the level of public
endorsement for the Muslim Brotherhood in
absolute terms had decreased. In the
parliamentary elections turnout was 62 per cent;
in the presidential elections, it had gone down to
51 per cent. The drop in electoral support should
not be taken lightly. It shows that citizens were
losing faith in the Muslim Brotherhood even
within the space of six months.
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Hence, Morsi’s commencement of a new
presidential term was not premised on a strong
majority. He began his term in office under
extreme pressure to deliver on his campaign
pledges of more jobs, a cleaner environment,
strengthening security and prosperity to be
enjoyed by all Egyptians. Signs of growing dissent
among the citizens began to appear soon in the
form of frequent and well-attended protests,
demonstrations, marches and sit-ins to protest
against political repression, economic need and
unmet promises. One year into office, non-
Islamist political parties had also disengaged
from participating in Morsi’s government and
their opposition to heavy-handed security
measures (such as on 4 December 2012, in front
of the presidential palace) catalysed the
formation of a counter-coalition front comprising
youth revolutionary forces, political parties, the
leadership of Al Azhar (Egypt’s highest Sunni
Muslim religious authority) and various social
movements such as women’s organisations and
labour groups. The growing level of discontent
on the streets manifested itself in daily eruptions
of one form or another of street activism after
Morsi’s first three months in office (which ended
in September 2012).
However, many of the leading academics who
have political salience in policy spaces continued
to focus in 2012–13 almost exclusively on liberal
procedural expressions of democratic
engagement in the formal arena. Marina
Ottaway, who was then a senior member of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an
influential thinktank with strong policy links to
the US administration, argued at the time that:
The most important step is for secular parties
to accept that, if they want a democratic
outcome, they have to fight in the electoral
arena. Democracy does not just mean
elections, though they are an unavoidable
component of a democratic process… It is not
that Islamists do not share the blame for the
present state of affairs. They have become
arrogant and overly sure of themselves, but
the only way to stop them is to show that they
are vulnerable to competition (Ottaway 2013).
It is interesting that she stresses that (electoral)
competition is the only way to oppose, resist or
hold accountable the authorities in power. As will
be shown in the next section, democratic
processes were occurring through contestation
and resistance rather than competition through
the ballot boxes.
Renowned transitologist Alfred Stepan, writing
for Freedom House, another major policy-
influencing thinktank, echoed the same
sentiment when he argued that:
The prospects for a democratic transition in
Egypt would be strengthened if liberal and
moderate Islamist forces would reach
consensus on the way forward, accept the
sovereignty of the Egyptian people, as expressed
in elections, and build the institutions needed to
ensure that when the elected government
takes office, it will uphold the rights of all
Egyptian citizens [author’s emphasis added]
(Stepan 2012).
Stepan’s statement suggests that the sovereignty
of the Egyptian people is manifested through
elections in terms of expression through elections.
This narrow focus on elections as a proxy for the
power of the people emanates from a particular
conception of expression of citizen voice which is
oblivious to the multitude of other forms and ways
in which citizens express themselves.
Marc Lynch, a professor of political science at
George Washington University and editor of
Foreign Policy’s Middle East page, a publication
with significant bearings on policy debates,
argued in December 2012 that the playing field
for mobilising for democracy is the elections.
Here, it is noteworthy, however, that in that same
month citizen participation in the constitutional
referendum that the Muslim Brotherhood-led
government staged in order to pass a
constitution that was considered by many
political forces in Egypt as exclusionary and in
violation of human rights (Tadros 2013), had
been as low as 32.9 per cent of eligible voters.
Lynch still believes that the platform for citizen
expression of dissent would be a future ballot
box: ‘The mediocre turnout at the constitutional
referendum suggests that they will be punished
at the ballot box for these failings – if their
political opponents can work effectively to
capitalize on the moment’ (Lynch 2012).
While many coalitions and political forces spoke
of an ongoing revolution to achieve the aims of
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the revolts of January 2011, and believed that the
Muslim Brotherhood’s legitimacy was on the line
(Tadros 2013), Lynch and other Western
academics still hung on to the idea that Egypt’s
transition stands a chance if people can voice
their agency through an election. Lynch argued:
But a strong electoral performance by the
opposition could also – finally – create
meaningful checks on Presidential authority
for the first time in modern Egyptian history.
The best case here would be that the
opposition can build on the energy of its
protests, its newfound unity and the strongly
felt antipathy towards the Muslim
Brotherhood, to compete effectively two
months from now in Parliamentary elections.
That would position it to legislate more liberal
interpretations of the Constitution, and to
block any Presidential efforts to impose a
more autocratic or more Islamist agenda
(Lynch 2012).
Thomas Carothers, a leading democracy expert
and vice-president of Carnegie, argued in May
2013, one month prior to the mass uprising that
brought down President Morsi’s regime, that the
highly politically volatile climate often witnessed
in post-dictator contexts means that there may
be rapid rotation of power as citizens vote one
candidate out of office in favour of an
alternative. While this comparative dimension is
welcomed for more nuanced analysis, it still
assumes that citizens will be expressing their
voices through the ballot boxes rather than other
forms of public expression:
The Brotherhood’s strong grassroots network
and relative leadership coherence may enable
it to become a long-ruling dominant force in
post-Mubarak Egypt. Yet in poor countries
with few natural resources, like Egypt,
whichever political group or party first gains
power after the collapse of the dictator
inherits the daunting problem of satisfying
unrealistically high expectations of citizens
for rapid and substantial improvements in
their daily lot. Some post-authoritarian
countries do settle into dominant-party rule
for sustained time periods; yet just as many
experience frequent alternations of power as
increasingly frustrated voters try one option
after another, including parties that initially
seemed marginal (Carothers 2013).
Beyond which political party makes an electoral
victory, evidence of decreasing citizen turnout in
referendums and elections in 2012 should have
been an important indicator to analysts that
citizens may not necessarily be expressing their
voices through the ballot boxes. In the following
section, I argue that many had chosen other forms
of public engagement that should have featured in
attempts to capture the pulse of the citizenry.
Moreover, by focusing on what happens in the
electoral politics, there was insufficient attention
being paid to the possibility that the new
government in Egypt would use elections as a
democratic mantra for undemocratic purposes.
Miller’s analysis of political processes following
the ousting of authoritarian regimes in sub-
Saharan Africa warned that:
A cautionary lesson can be drawn from the
wave of political transitions that in the early
to mid-1990s swept through sub-Saharan
Africa, a region with nearly as little prior
democratic experience as the Arab world.
Though overall less tumultuous than the
revolutions of the Arab Spring, these
transitions occurred relatively quickly and
many involved public protests. After the initial
swell of change, many of these transitions
failed to deliver enduring democratization…
newly elected regimes often practiced old forms
of repression or manipulated democratic
formalities to their benefit (Miller 2012).
Elis Goldberg argued that, against the backdrop
of increasing contestation of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s governance, the practice of
elections does not put Egypt on the path of a
democratic transition. She suggested that
judging from the level of protests, Egypt is very
much in the midst of an unfinished revolution.
For the Muslim Brotherhood, she contended:
[E]ven a large electoral majority in
parliamentary elections may not, for the
foreseeable future, translate into viable
governance as popular demands continue to
be expressed in ways that are both democratic
and disruptive and as the political leadership
of the country finds it difficult to agree on a
common path forward (Goldberg 2013).
Some Egyptian analysts have been more scathing
in their critique, arguing against the tyranny of
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the ballotocracy or boxocracy. Amr Ezzat, a
renowned blogger reflected:
Once the voting was over, it meant that there
were two parties – on the one hand, a
triumphant winner who demanded all
advantages of power, and on the other, the
defeated losers. Ballot box does nothing to
guarantee civil freedoms and rights. Ballot
box rule encourages the winner to do anything
to seize the levers of state power. And on
30 June, the flimsy legitimacy of ballot box
rule finally crumbled (Ezzat 2013).
One of the conceptual and methodological
limitations of focusing on electoral-procedural
dimensions and the formal players in political
society is that it fails to take into account the
constellation of factors that are key to substantive
elements of democracy such as citizenship rights.
The mass uprising of June 2013 was unexpected
by many analysts and commentators due to its
scale (far bigger turnout than that of January
2011) and plurality of citizen profiles (rural as
well as urban, disproportionately high
representation from women, more governorates
from around the country). By focusing almost
exclusively on the elections being a proxy for
legitimacy, analysts had failed to recognise the
growing population expressing their voice
through alternative means.
Ezzat (2013), however, also acknowledges that
even with the downfall of the Morsi regime, new
political orders may seek to reproduce the same
attempts at usurping power, monopolising it and
legitimising it through the ballot box. He argues
that the only backstopper against this happening
is in people rising in protest again and again.
This is critically important for the current
context in Egypt in which El-Sissi, the former
Minister of Defence who ousted Morsi has won
the presidential elections with an overwhelming
majority vote (over 96 per cent). If he does not
deliver on the people’s aspirations, they will rise
again. In a survey of over 2,400 women and men
who participated in the 30 June revolts in 2013,
over half of them had said in December
2013/January 2014 that their preference would
be for El-Sissi as president; however, 79.2 per
cent said they would rise again if their
aspirations were not met (Tadros 2014a). This is
critically important as it suggests that citizens’
commitment to expressing their voice is still
strong, even three years after the first revolution
of 2011. We should not, however, fall into the
same pitfalls of analysis by assuming that they
will necessarily express any opposition through
the next presidential elections in five years’
time. Citizens may choose to express their voice
through boycotting elections, or engaging in
some kind of unruly politics (see Section 2), be it
through street activism or through some other
context-appropriate means of expressing
themselves.
2 Unruly politics and unorganised public action
The uprisings that ruptured the status quo in
Egypt in 2011 and 2013 challenge us to rethink
the mechanisms, the agendas and the actors we
associate with social and political activism. Ali
(2012) suggested that prior to the January 25th
revolution, the protests became so frequent that
he could not keep track of them anymore, nor did
the press bother to report all of them (Tadros
2012a). Yet these protests were important
precursors to the revolution because they served
as political incubators for politicised action for
many and provided people with the
organisational skills needed to act collectively.
While these protests were going on, many
leading opposition public figures and
intellectuals (such as Ibrahim Eissa) were at the
time lamenting why Egyptians did not rise up.
Many missed these episodes of public dissent
because these forms of collective action did not fit
the checklist of what constitutes the right way to
challenge the status quo by the right citizenry.
When workers, labourers, farmers and Copts
(Egyptian Christians) organised protests, these
were often shunned as too narrow in their
representation and demands. In other words,
these protests were not seen as chipping at the
status quo. The same dismissive attitude informed
many of the analyses of the continued protests by
the same groups in Egypt after the revolution.
There was an equally derisive response from
many of the local intelligentsia towards the
tactics deployed to show public dissidence as
lacking in a radical edge or a sufficiently forceful
assault on the ruling authorities to be of any
effect.
Yet in many cases, dissidents were aware that
clashes with the security forces would lead to
their incarceration and repression, so they found
other ways of being disruptive using what
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McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) would
typically call mechanisms of contentious politics.
One of the most successful tactics was the ‘Stay
at Home’ campaign launched by one of the youth
movements that emerged during Mubarak’s
reign, the ‘April 6 Youth Movement’ which in
2008, via Facebook and text messages called
upon people not to go to work. The strategy
subverted the security apparatus threats against
workers who dare to strike or citizens who
protest in solidarity. Groups of citizens informed
the politicians by making noise with pots and
pans that they were hungry. The April 6 Youth
Movement raised straw broomsticks in front of
the shrine of the Prophet’s daughter, at the
Sayeda Zeinab district, to signal that the country
is in need of a clean-up.
What is significant is that the actors were not
the conventional agents of change; they were not
civil society organisations, nor social movements,
nor political parties – in other words, they were
not the conventional actors associated with the
development and democratisation policy
domains. They could not be neatly
compartmentalised into types of civil society
organisations because in most cases, they did not
have an organisational structure in the first
place. It is in this sense that such actors’
engagement in unruly politics is so critically
important. Unruly politics here is defined as the
marginal space through which citizens engage politically
outside the conventional realms of state and civil society
[emphasis added] (Tadros 2012a). All kinds of
actors with progressive and regressive agendas
engage in unruly politics, hence the caution
against its romanticisation. Irrespective of
whether unruly politics achieves its desired
outcomes in terms of making the regime more
responsive to its demands, its very dynamics as it
played out in Egypt during Mubarak’s later
tenure and the post-Mubarak revolutionary
phase suggest that the status quo was being
fundamentally shaken to its very fabric.
The significance of unruly politics manifests
itself when we examine the political landscape of
activism in Egypt prior to the uprisings. Abd el
Wahab (2012) shows that civil society in Egypt by
and large no longer served as the arena for
contestation, except on the fringes (judges’
clubs, professional syndicates and workers’
independent groups). His analysis suggests that
civil society organisations had become too
orderly, too politically contained for engagement
in contentious politics, so much so that when
youth wanted to become politically active, they
sought other spaces and other mechanisms that
are neither institutionalised nor under the
auspices of particular organisational umbrellas.
Even after the January 25th revolution of 2011,
the focus of political analysis continues to be on
the larger protests, initiated by organised visible
actors in political society such as the youth
revolutionary movements, the Islamist groups, or
the opposition parties. However, beyond the pre-
planned, pre-organised media-appealing major
protests that occur on an interval basis, there are
small, spontaneous protests regularly taking
place at an average estimate of 11 protests a day.
Irrespective of their agendas, these forms of
citizen engagement in unruly politics represent
important signals of public unrest, and they
should not be ignored. They reflect one indicator
of ‘the pulse on the ground’ that requires careful
examination. Two years after the revolution, the
number of everyday protests organised by small
groups of citizens has increased but has gone
underneath the radar.
The frequency and disparity of protests in 2012 is
one of the strongest indicators of the angry pulse
of the citizens under the new Muslim
Brotherhood-led government. This is a viable
conclusion to arrive at since other factors have
remained constant throughout the past two
years. For example, the political space to protest
has not changed, nor has the level of political
mobilisation increased during those last two
years. Yet one of the strong variables congruent
with the rise in frequency of protests is Morsi’s
assumption of the presidency in July 2012. There
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Table 1 Protests in Egypt by different groups, 2012
Organiser Number
Government sector 1,381
Citizens 1,205
Private sector employees 410
Public sector workers 222
Self-employed 204
Total 3,422
Source ECESR (2013).
1 Joshi_Schultze-Kraft IDSB45.5.qxd  11/08/2014  16:50  Page 52
were 185 protests in January, 119 in February,
170 in March, 270 in April, 206 in May, 157 in
June, after which there is a dramatic leap to 566
in July, 410 in August, 615 in September, 507 in
October, 508 in November and 104 in December1
(ECESR 2013).
In 2012 there were 3,422 protests witnessed in
Egypt across a spectrum of groups within the
population.
An analysis of these protests serves to refute a
number of government-propagated myths about
citizen participation regarding their profile,
motives, geographical focus and political
orientation. One of the myths is that only the
political elites who are disconnected from the rest
of the population are protesting, because they do
not wish to have a Muslim Brotherhood-led
regime, one that has the endorsement of the rest
of the population. It is important to note that with
the exception of self-employed and private sector
employees whose socioeconomic background may
cut across classes, the other categories listed in
Table 1 are likely to come from the poor and petite
bourgeoisie. Hence, these protestors are not the
alienated few, they represent constituencies from
within the wider population.
The second myth is that protests are essentially
a Cairene phenomenon, and beyond the capital
citizens have no interest in such street politics. It
is true that the largest number of protests were
held in Cairo (684); however, it does not
represent a substantial percentage of the total
(only 10 per cent) in 2012. The Delta
governorates combined witnessed more protests
than Cairo (Al Gharbiyya 282, Alexandria 232,
Al Sharqiyya 222, Al Dakhaliyya 182). There
were also 130 and 212 protests in the Upper
Egyptian governorates of Asiut and Minya
respectively. Kaft el Sheikh witnessed 161
protests, with the remaining protests occurring
in Qalubiyya, Ismailiya and Fayoum combined.
The third widely propagated myth is the notion
that these protests were organised by secular
anti-Muslim Brotherhood elements. An analysis
of the data suggests that the majority of these
protests were not staged by members of political
society but by ordinary citizens, some of whom
would have predictably voted for the Muslim
Brotherhood in previous elections. In most cases,
citizens protested over economic issues, most
notably food shortages and increases in food
prices, water and fuel crises, and basic human
security issues such as unsafe streets and lack of
personal safety.
The mass uprisings that led to the ousting of
President Morsi’s regime in July 2013 occurred
at a time in which the country was sitting on a
volcano of continued eruption of protests.
According to the Democracy Index findings,2
Egypt witnessed 14,270 protests in 2013. In view
of the deeply volatile political context of the
country in that year, 67 per cent of 2013’s
protests, or 8,999, were political. Some of these
political protests against President Morsi in the
first half of 2013, however, occurred post-June
2013 after the ousting of the President following
a people’s uprising. It is not the aim of this
article to discuss whether the rupture of 30 June
2013 was a revolution or a coup. Undoubtedly the
demise of the Muslim Brotherhood president was
met with a wave of political protests initiated by
pro-Morsi supporters. Since many of the pro-
Morsi protests were associated with acts of
violence and the article focuses on non-violent
collective action, we have excluded them from
analysis (Tadros 2014b).
If political protests rose in the second half of
2013, economically driven protests had a
converse trend. They peaked in the first half of
2013 and waned in the second half, suggesting
that bread and butter issues were among the
main drivers of the June 2013 drivers. A total of
3,212 protests were organised to demand labour
rights, ‘especially the right to work or the rights
relating to appropriate pay’ for workers.
According to the report, a total of 1,052 protests
were organised to claim wages, back pay, or
promised demands. Yet the remainder were led
by citizens that are not necessarily organised in
collective entities, and who took to the street to
protest daily encroachments on their rights and
deteriorating conditions.
In many of the examples examined, for instance,
citizens were not only asking for individual rights
but a more accountable governance structure –
i.e. workers in the hospital pressing for an inquiry
into corruption and an investigation into missing
medical supplies, or citizens who block the
highway as a consequence of the disappearance of
a farm owner, or a young female pupil – who
demand a police force that is more effective in
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dealing with crime and more responsive to their
complaints.
The above protests serve as a warning sign that
citizens’ spontaneous organising in response to
everyday hardships should not be taken lightly.
Citizens’ participation in protests and strikes is
indicative of the existence of a mobilised social
repertoire, i.e. citizens’ accumulation of
experience and memories of claiming
entitlements and seeking accountability via some
sort of public action en masse. If this repertoire is
catalysed by the right constellation of factors it
could potentially have a snowball effect,3
encouraging others to take part. A mobilised
social repertoire, under particular conditions,
could lead to a tipping over, releasing floodgates of
mass citizen action. The fact that citizens are not
organised and do not have a collective front may
be considered by some as an obstacle to their
ability to prevent cooption of citizens and plan for
mass mobilisation. However, a counter-perspective
is that because they are not organised in a
collective form, it is more difficult for the security
apparatus to identify leaders, expose plans and
use coercive measures to disintegrate them.
It is impossible to predict how citizens’
involvement in unruly politics will affect political
outcomes due to the non-linearity of cause and
effect in complex and volatile political settings
where in any given instance there are several
unknown, unexpected internal and external
factors of influence.
3 Alternative expressions of citizen voices
The mass mobilisation of citizens that occurred
surprised both the ‘uprisers’ and the many
political analysts and scholars. Clearly, there was
a failure to capture the ‘pulse of the street’ prior
to the uprisings, whether in 2011 or in 2013.
After the 25 January uprising in 2011, in addition
to street politics (protests, stand-ins, marches),
other forms of unruly politics have emerged
which provide us with a good sense of the citizen
pulse on the ground. Political satire became a
highly popular means of citizen engagement in
2011–12, thanks to the television programme of
Bassem Youssef, El Bernameg. The programme,
which had at its peak a following of an estimated
five million people, mostly makes fun of the
president, the Islamists and occasionally the
secular forces. The show gripped millions of
Egyptians, and incurred the wrath of both the
government and key leaders in the Islamist
movements. What is significant is not the
critique of the president or the government, but
the way in which it is conveyed (through
humour) and the broad-based support it has
garnered. On Friday night, at the time of the
broadcasting of the programme, many of Cairo’s
streets are empty as if a decisive football match
is taking place. Whether huddled inside the
coffee shops or at home, citizens are glued to
their television sets. The discussions, the
debates, the repetition of the most popular parts
of the programme are an indicator of the pulse
of the street. However, as the mood on the street
changed in the aftermath of the uprising of 2013,
El Bernameg’s popularity among the public
slumped. El-Sissi’s mass popularity at that point
in time (2014) meant that political satire in
engaging with the president was not well placed.
Songs, poetry, street performances, dances,
graffiti, and political cartoons reached new
frontiers of innovation and creativity since the
revolution of January 2011. While these have
been cultural expressions for hundreds of years,
it is how they became politicised, who politicises
them at what moment that represents unruly
politics. For example, one such incident involved
a female pupil at a primary school in Hurghada
who was supposed to recite a poem in front of the
Minister of Education (known to be affiliated to
the Muslim Brotherhood) visiting the premises
at the time. When presenting in front of the
minister, she changed the words of the poem and
ended it with a highly subversive assault on
Morsi (Shaban 2013). The minister apparently
got up and left. These everyday acts of
subversion that send powerful messages of
resistance and dissent are a form of engaging
politically which are indicative once again of the
pulse on the ground.
This article has cautioned against two dangers
that threaten to create new disconnects between
what is happening on the ground and our analysis
of the political situation. The first is the use of a
highly reductionist approach to transitions that
basically equates ballot box practices with
democracy in the case of Egypt. It has argued that
elections are happening simultaneously with a
process of deepening authoritarianism, very
much reproduced à la Mubarak. The new
element is the representation of the new regime
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as being led by the devout and pious guardians of
Islam. The religious element has mass appeal for
large sections of the population, in particular
those living in rural areas. However, even
supporters of the ‘unfinished transition’ scenario
need to be cautious of focusing exclusively on
institutional and procedural mechanisms such as
holding elections. The multiple voices,
constituencies and platforms through which
people are expressing their citizenship outside
the ballot boxes are too important to ignore. If a
constellation of factors leads to the outbreak of
an uprising (the ‘unfinished revolution’ scenario),
then those who have assumed an essentialist
engagement with what constitutes democracy
and have supported the regime, will find
themselves again disconnected from the citizenry.
The second danger that threatens to reproduce
the kind of disconnects that characterised many
analysts’ sense of citizen agency prior to the
Egyptian uprisings of 2011 and 2013 is the failure
to engage with unruly politics. Unruly politics is
different from political sociologists’ framing and
conceptualisation of contentious politics. Both
unruly politics and contentious politics examine
forms of mobilisation outside the conventional
spaces of formal citizen expression and outside
the realm of conventional actors. But the major
difference between the two is that contentious
politics’ primary concern is with organised citizen
action whereas unruly politics also examines ways
in which disparate citizens spontaneously
coalesce around an issue even when there has
been no previous organisation.
In the Egyptian case, this has taken various forms:
citizens queuing for bread suddenly starting a
protest, people instantly blocking the highway
after the disappearance of a citizen, and so forth.
Often in these instances citizens have mobilised
without the mediation of organised political
actors such as political parties, social movements
and non-governmental organisations – in other
words, the conventional political society actors.
Unruliness may take different forms, occupy
different spaces and involve different actors
depending on the context. However, in this
article I have sought to show how spontaneous,
non-formal everyday protests and strikes
represent an important ‘pulse of the street’, and
an important channel through which citizens
seek accountability from the state. The failure to
acknowledge and deal with the growing
repertoire of citizens’ expression of voice
through street politics represents disengagement
with the kind of unruly politics that does not
feature in the conventional political society or
contentious politics analysis.
We also need a better understanding of the spatial
dynamics of street politics and the different forms
of unruliness it assumes. We need to analyse
whether there is a difference in how protests are
mobilised, between the more organised incidents
such as those organised by workers, women or
Copts, and those more spontaneous and sporadic
that cut across identity markers. The temporal
dimensions of protests are also important: how
long do the protests last, and what affects the
decision to sustain or call them off?
An examination of the unruly politics initiated
not only by organised citizens’ movements but by
the disorganised and spontaneous daily forms of
citizens’ dissent would contribute immensely to
our understanding of accountability mechanisms
in transition contexts, where the repertoire of
revolutionary activism is still pertinent. However,
some caution is needed in the interpretation of
the citizen pulse: citizens’ choice of expression of
dissent changes according to time and
circumstance. Hence, a waning of protests in
Egypt in a particular year may not necessarily
mean a waning of dissidence, it could also mean
a shift in how citizens choose to express their
voices. Second, because citizens’ expression of
voice is unpredictable, it is important that
attempts at capturing the pulse are responsive to
emerging manifestations of political agency,
without presupposing a ‘menu’ of how they will
act. Finally, the reading of the pulse has to be
extremely sensitive to contextual specificity,
otherwise a misinterpretation of the dynamics of
citizen agency can occur.
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Notes
1 Please note that the report warns that they
had only looked at the first week of December.
The numbers for the rest of the month had
yet to be released at the time of submission of
this article (1 May 2014). 
2 This section relies on the data presented in
the report by Omar (2014). 
3 For the snowball effect in relation to the
Egyptian revolution, see Ezbawy (2012).
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